The Role and Influence of the People’s Republic of China on Visegrad Group Countries

On 29-31 May, at the invitation of the Chinese side, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Hungary, Zbigniew Rau and Péter Szijjártó, visited Guiyang city in Guizhou province. There they met with Minister Wang Yi, with whom they discussed the matters of current economic and political cooperation, in particular the future of the 17+1 group. The visits coincided with a crisis in relations between China and the EU as well as the imposition of sanctions by each side in connection with the persecution of the Uighur minority in Xinjiang. The meeting was also prompted by the announcement of the Lithuanian Foreign Minister who said that Vilnius would effectively withdraw from the 17+1 format, which is a platform for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries.

A several-hour long virtual summit of the Heads of States of the 17+1 format members, i.e., the Central and Eastern European Countries and China, took place on February 9, 2021. For the first time in the history of the initiative, China was represented by the President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping. It was another opportunity for Beijing to make its presence in the region known.

A telephone conversation between Polish and Chinese Ministers of Foreign Affairs Zbigniew Rau and Wang Yi took place on January 22, 2021. The Ministers discussed plans for 2021, including the organization of a summit of the 17+1 initiative. Furthermore, Wang Yi expressed his desire to “deepen trust” in Poland-China bilateral relations, which “should not be influenced by a third party.” Despite growing trade and good relations between the presidents of the two countries, communication between Warsaw and Beijing has stalled for some time. Following a period of dynamic development of relationships between 2008 and 2016, the cooperation has weakened under the rule of the United Right (Polish: Zjednoczona Prawica). This is due to a disappointment with the lack of significant progress of the Belt and Road Initiative, the 17+1 format as well as limited access to the Chinese market for Polish manufacturers. The confrontational policy of Donald Trump’s administration towards China, described as the biggest threat to the United States’ position, has been an additional obstacle. Poland, most likely under pressure from Washington, rejected the possibility of greater Chinese involvement in the construction of the Central Communication Port (CPK) and took steps to limit Huawei’s access to the 5G infrastructure market.

The November 2020 report “European public opinion on China in the age of COVID-19. Differences and common ground across the continent” prepared by the Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), a Slovak think tank, presents interesting data on the attitudes of European citizens, including the members of the Visegrad Group (V4), towards China. The V4 countries are more or less in the middle of the ranking and its citizens generally have negative opinions about Beijing. However, the public opinion on China has worsened in the case of nearly all European citizens. It is a result of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the so-called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” adopted by Chinese officials.

Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, Huawei has achieved a leading position on the markets of the Visegrád Group, both in terms of digital infrastructure and mobile devices. During Donald Trump’s presidency (2017-2021), the US authorities made extensive diplomatic efforts to eliminate Huawei from the European Union’s (EU) 5G infrastructure, pointing to political and intelligence threats and the company’s cooperation with the Communist Party of China. As a result of these actions, numerous bilateral declarations on 5G were adopted, also by the V4 countries (Poland and Slovakia). Simultaneously, the position of the EU has aggravated – its institutions began to put more emphasis on level playing field and reciprocity in economic relations. The report on the EU coordinated risk assessment, presented in October 2019, and the EU Toolbox, adopted in January 2020, highlighted the risks of cooperation with “untrustworthy suppliers.” This was a clear message to the company from Shenzhen that the political climate has deteriorated.

From August 30 to September 5, the President of the Czech Senate Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan. This stay resulted in a series of diplomatic and media events, which in turn worsened China-Czech Republic relations. The articles published in the Chinese media and statements by political representatives of the Communist Party of China (CPC) critically approached this situation, which is yet another manifestation of the Chinese diplomatic and information offensive. In this episode, we talk about the events and comments regarding this visit based on statements made by the CPC diplomats and materials mainly from the Global Times daily, which were reprinted in other Chinese media.

On December 16, 2019, the Minister for Innovation and Technology of Hungary – László Palkovics, and the rector of Fudan University – Xu Ningsheng, signed an agreement in Shanghai to establish the first foreign Fudan campus in Budapest. In mid-September 2020, there were also reports in the Hungarian media that the campus is to be completed by 2024 with a goal of educating 5-6 thousand students. These plans would result in Fudan gaining a strong position in Hungarian higher education.